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PIERSON V. POST 
THE NEW LEARNING 
Daniel R. Ernst† 
IERSON V. POST, 3 Caines 175 (N.Y. 1805), one of the 
most commonly assigned cases in the first-year Property 
course, was a dispute over the ownership of a fox discov-
ered at large “upon a certain wild and uninhabited, unpos-
sessed and waste land, called the beach.” For a very long time, all 
that was known about the case, other than the report itself, was a 
vivid but antiquarian account published in the Sag Harbor Express of 
October 24, 1895, by the judge and local historian Henry Parsons 
Hedges (1817-1911). Hedges claimed to have met Jesse Pierson 
(1780-1840) and Lodowick Post (1777-1842). He judged them 
“specimens of physical power and high resolve that would have 
made them as champions formidable in modern or ancient times,” 
as well as “rich, resolute, [and] wilful.” According to Hedges, Jesse 
was walking home from his job as a schoolteacher “when he saw the 
fox fleeing from his pursuers and run into the hiding place,” which 
Hedges identified as “an old shoal well.” “In a moment, with a bro-
ken rail, he was at the well’s mouth and killed the fox, threw it 
over his shoulder, and was taking it home when Lodowick, with his 
hounds and partisans, met him and demanded the fox.” Jesse de-
murred. “It may be you was going to kill him, but you did not kill 
him,” he retorted. “I was going to kill him and did kill him.”  
                                                                                                
† Daniel Ernst is a professor of law at Georgetown University Law Center. 
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Readers have never known just how far to credit Hedges’s ac-
count. Our knowledge of the case improved significantly with the 
appearance of a spate of articles between 2002 and 2009. Here is a 
summary of “the new learning.”  
THE ANTAGONISTS 
ecause of the youthfulness of the litigants and the great dispar-
ity between the expense of the litigation and the value of the 
fox, generations of property teachers have speculated whether ani-
mosity between the litigants’ fathers, who must have paid the bills, 
was behind the case. Property teachers dating at least from the great 
James Casner and Barton Leach have suspected that the dispute had 
an ethnic dimension. It was a squabble between a “stubborn af-
fronted Dutchman” and an “English-descended violator of the fox-
hunter’s code,” they speculated, seemingly on the supposition that 
“Lodowick” was a Dutch name. In an article published in 2006, law 
professor Bethany Berger points out that the name was “as likely 
English or Scottish.”1 (One might add that if the Posts were Dutch, 
Hedges would have discovered the fact and woven it into his tale.) 
Now it appears that although a social conflict was at work, it was 
not ethnic but a clash between an established member of a tradi-
tional society and an ostentatious arriviste.  
Jesse Pierson’s family had deep roots in his community, South-
ampton, in what is now Suffolk County, New York. His father, 
David, fought in the Revolutionary War and, according to Hedges, 
was “of the best blood of England: so strong in Calvinist inclinations 
and proclivities that some called him a fatalist.” Berger adds that 
David was elected thirteen times as the town’s “fence viewer,” 
“charged with ensuring that individuals maintained their portion of 
fence against straying animals and did not fence in land that was not 
their own,” or as its commissioner of highways. His service con-
firms Hedges’s claims for his stature in Southampton society. 
                                                                                                
1 A. James Casner & W. Barton Leach, Cases on Property, revised temporary edition 
(1948), quoted in Bethany Berger, “It’s Not About the Fox: The Untold History 
of Pierson v. Post,” Duke Law Journal 55 (2006): 1092 n. 11; ibid., 1092 n. 10. 
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The Piersons probably regarded the Posts as vulgar upstarts, 
who, with their fox hunting, aped the English gentry and trampled 
upon social conventions. Nathan Post had become wealthy not 
through peaceable, virtuous agriculture but war and commerce. 
The Posts’ appearances in local histories, Angela Fernandez of the 
University of Toronto Faculty of Law reports, were “usually in as-
sociation with a lucrative economic interest they were involved 
with such as whaling.”2 They lived in town, in what Hedges de-
scribed as “a capacious dwelling,” with well-decorated walls, wain-
scoting, and other touches “in what was then thought superior 
style.” (It also had a whipping post for the Posts’ slaves, which 
Hedges claimed to have seen.) Nathan had gained a financial stake as 
a privateer during the Revolutionary War and made still more 
money trading with the West Indies. A contemporary who tangled 
with him in a minor affair of town politics left a scathing descrip-
tion: 
Capt. Post descended from parentage extremely low and 
poor; accordingly his education was rough and uncouth. Yet 
he possessed a strong desire to be thought a man of informa-
tion and importance. This frequently led him to tell large, 
pompous stories, of which himself was ever the hero. He was 
a great swaggerer over those whom he found calculated to 
bear it; but to others he was supple, cringing, and mean.3 
This contemporary was a quarrelsome man who invariably depicted 
his opponents in the worst possible terms. Perhaps Post’s grave-
stone was a more reliable guide to his character. “He was a respect-
able Magistrate, a kind relation, a good Patriot, and an honest man,” 
it proclaimed. Then again, perhaps even this testimony should be 
taken with a grain of salt. After all, de mortuis nil nisi bonum. 
In any event, and as Hedges wrote, “If a contest should arise be-
tween these sons, and if the fathers should each advocate the cause 
of his son, it would be no ordinary conflict.” 
                                                                                                
2 Angela Fernandez, “The Lost Record of Pierson v. Post, The Famous Fox Case,” 
Law and History Review 27 (2009): 167. 
3 Stephen Burroughs, Memoirs of Stephen Burroughs (1811), 2: 41, quoted in Berger, 
“It’s Not About the Fox,” 1127. 
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PROCEEDINGS IN THE JUSTICE’S COURT 
he limited view of proceedings in the trial court from the pub-
lished opinion has long frustrated teachers who like to have 
their first-year students consider how lawyers shape the raw facts of 
a dispute into a cause of action. We now have more insight into this 
process, because Fernandez discovered the “judgment roll” in the 
case and posted her transcription on the website of the Law and His-
tory Review.4  
Pierson and Post had their altercation on December 10, 1802. 
Before the month was out – on December 30, in fact – their dispute 
was before John N. Fordham, a Justice of the Peace. We now know 
that Post claimed an injury of up to $25, the maximum under the 
streamlined procedures of the Twenty-Five Dollar Act of 1801. 
Apparently Post hired a lawyer to write his complaint, for, as Char-
les Donahue has observed, it was too well-framed to have come 
from a lay pen.5 At trial however, the litigants appeared “in their 
proper person” – that is, without representation by counsel.6 
The judgment roll contains nothing like a verbatim transcript of 
the proceedings, but it does reveal a few more nuggets about the 
trial. It states that Fordham convened his court in a private resi-
dence, “the house of Hugh Gelston,” which was located in South-
amption in Suffolk County.7 In keeping with the Twenty-Five Dollar 
                                                                                                
4 A judgment roll is “the file of records comprising the pleadings in a case, and all 
the other proceedings up to the judgment, arranged in order.” Black’s Law Diction-
ary (1891). See Fernandez, “Lost Record”; www.historycooperative.org/journals 
/lhr/27.1/. 
5 Charles Donahue, Jr., “Papyrology and 3 Caines 175,” Law and History Review 27 
(2009): 180-81. 
6 Fernandez argues that the Twenty-Five Dollar Act banned lawyers from the 
proceedings at the time. A later version of the statute, 1808 N.Y. Laws 204, 
§ 25, did include a ban, but the 1801 version of the law had no such provision. 
1801 N.Y. Laws 165. 1810 N.Y. Laws 193 repealed the ban in the 1808 law. 
(Thanks to Fred Turner for spotting the repeal.) 
7 Historians of the case now agree that Tompkins simply erred in writing that the 
dispute came to his court on “a return to a certiorari directed to one of the jus-
tices of Queens county.” 
T 
Pierson v. Post 
AUTUMN 2009 35 
Act, the constable had summoned a panel of twelve veniremen, 
from which Fordham selected a jury of six by drawing names out of 
a box. Seven witnesses were summoned to testify. 
Further, although we do not know exactly how Post argued his 
case, we do know that he alleged that Pierson acted “maliciously” – 
that is, for the purpose of harming Post, and not for some other 
reason, such as a desire to kill a verminous animal. The latter would 
seem to have been a good argument for Pierson, because “vermin” 
constitute a subcategory of animals ferae naturae that are always nui-
sances and incapable of being owned by anyone.8 Moreover, as re-
cently as 1791, Southampton had placed a temporary bounty on 
foxes, which were carrying off the chickens of the town.9 
This allegation, the writ Post obtained (trespass on the case), 
and the facts of the underlying dispute would seem to point to a 
theory of intentional tort. As Donahue put it, “the point of Post’s 
suit against Pierson is not that Pierson took Post’s fox. The point is 
that Pierson interfered with the hunt.” Besides, if “the gist of the 
action were Post’s possession (and hence ownership) of the fox, the 
wrong form of action was used. It should have been trespass, not 
trespass on the case.”10 
It happens that under the common law Post would face a possi-
bly fatal obstacle if he framed his case as an intentional tort. If he 
had been hunting for commercial reasons – as the plaintiff did in the 
great case of Keeble v. Hickeringill (Q.B. 1707) – then he would have 
suffered a cognizable harm. But Post was hunting for recreational 
purposes, and the common law refused to protect “things of mere 
pleasure and delight” (such as recreation).11 If Fordham knew his 
                                                                                                
8 Andrea McDowell, “Legal Fictions in Pierson v. Post,” Michigan Law Review 105 
(2007): 746-48. 
9 Berger, “It’s Not About the Fox,” 1130-31.  
10 Charles Donahue, Jr., “Animalia Ferae Naturae: Rome, Bologna, Leyden, Oxford, 
and Queen’s County, N.Y.,” in Studies in Roman Law: In Memory of A. Arthur 
Schiller, ed. Roger S. Bagnall and William V. Harris (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986), 
48; Donahue, “Papyrology,” 181-82. 
11 A.W.B. Simpson, Leading Cases in the Common Law (Oxford, 1995), 64; see also 
McDowell, “Legal Fictions.” The rule has been overturned by statute. For exam-
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law, Post might have lost his case. 
Why wasn’t this obstacle fatal to Post’s suit? One very likely 
possibility was that in fact Fordham did not know his law. Although 
we know nothing about him, other than that he was a Southampton 
man, a legal commentator generally assumed that New York’s JPs 
were “plain people, unacquainted with legal learning.”12 We have 
no reason to think that Fordham was an exception. Thus, Fernandez 
suggests that he and the jurors might well have been “inclined to 
look at what happened, take a more common sense approach, and 
give Post a remedy without worrying too much about what cate-
gory of law to attach it to.”13 
On whatever theory, the jury found for Post and awarded him 
“seventy-five cents for his damages besides his costs.” Those costs 
Fordham set at $5 (about $100 today), which was the maximum 
under the Twenty-Five Dollar Act. Seventy-five cents in 1802 is 
roughly the equivalent of $15 today. A nice fox pelt was worth 
about $1.  
THE APPEAL 
f one puzzle was why litigants bothered to commence and appeal 
a suit when so little money was at stake, another is why the 
judges of the New York Supreme Court devoted so much attention 
and learning to the case. The judges had it before them for quite 
some time: the jury reached its verdict in Fordham’s court on De-
cember 30, 1802, and the New York Supreme Court did not an-
nounce its decision until September 10, 1805. It reversed the 
judgment of the justice’s court and awarded Pierson $121.37 (about 
$2,150 today) for his “costs and charges” in the appeal. 
Fernandez puts the appeal in the context of a campaign by New 
York’s elite lawyers to raise the sophistication of New York’s bench 
                                                                                                
ple, Virginia’s “hunter harassment” statute reads: “It shall be unlawful to willfully 
and intentionally impede the lawful hunting or trapping of wild birds or wild 
animals.” Va. Code Ann. § 29.1-521.1. 
12 Esek Cowen, A Treatise on the Civil Jurisdiction of a Justice of the Peace, in the State of 
New York (Albany: W. M. Gould, 1821), 302, quoted in Fernandez, “Lost Re-
cord,” 159. 
13 Fernandez, “Lost Record,” 169. 
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and bar. Providing JPs with simple guides to the official “law in the 
books” was one way to do this, and in fact the state had an excellent 
“JP manual,” Samuel Brown’s The Justice’s Directory, or, Points on Cer-
tiorari: Being a Digest of the Cases Reported by Johnson and Caines 
(1813).14 It could also be advanced through the aggressive review of 
the JPs’ judgments. Fernandez writes that by 1814 the New York 
Supreme Court was hearing nearly two hundred appeals from Jus-
tices’ Courts every year, even though many involved small mone-
tary judgments. She posits that “a disciplinary process [was] at 
work.”15 
Another target of the campaign to create “learned law for New 
York” was the legal profession itself. A display of learning could up 
the ante for legal argument, exclude the socially undistinguished 
from remunerative litigation in a kind of intellectual arms race, and 
affirm the well-educated lawyer’s own sense of the bar as a learned 
profession. The campaign had a broader, social dimension as well. 
As New York democratized, a new breed of politicians denounced 
judge-made common law as the last refuge of feudal privilege in 
republican America and demanded codification by the more popular 
legislature. The great paladin who marched out to face down this 
challenge was James Kent (1763-1847), who served as a justice 
(1798-1804) and chief justice of the New York Supreme Court 
(1804-1814) and as the state’s chancellor (1814-1823). Kent in-
sisted that “a great proportion of the rules and maxims which con-
stitute the immense code of the common law” was readily knowable 
from the reports.16 Further legal treatises, including his own Com-
mentaries on American Law (1826-1830), were surer guides to legal 
principles than whatever the lesser breed of lawyer-legislators could 
enact in a code. In short, as the legal historian John H. Langbein 
                                                                                                
14 On JP manuals, see John A. Conley, “Doing It by the Book: Justice of the Peace 
Manuals and English Law in Eighteenth-Century America,” Journal of Legal History 
6 (1985): 257-98. 
15 Fernandez, “Lost Record,” 171. 
16 Kent quoted in Angela Fernandez, “Pierson v. Post: A Great Debate, James Kent, 
and the Project of Building a Learned Law for New York State,” Law and Social 
Inquiry 34 (2009): 326.  
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writes, “Kent made his career stand for the learned law.”17 
Fernandez notes that in colonial New York, as elsewhere in the 
common-law world, elite lawyers tried to raise the level of learning 
in the legal profession with “moots,” arguments of hypothetical 
cases before a select audience, often of law students. New York’s 
judges, she speculates, may have had a similarly didactic aim in Pier-
son v. Post. To be learned, in their estimation, a lawyer ought to 
have devoted hours of his apprenticeship to reading Justinian and 
the great natural law jurists of the European continent on the ori-
gins of property. When the case bobbed up from Fordham’s court, 
they seized it as an occasion to “create a more refined legal profes-
sion and a body of sophisticated law for New York State.”18 
For Pierson v. Post to serve the judges’ purpose, it would have to 
turn on fundamental principles of law rather than some failure to 
comply with a trivial provision of the Twenty-Five Dollars Act or 
the overlooking of a well-established precedent. Fernandez’s dis-
covery of the judgment roll has now revealed that the judges might 
have disposed of the case on narrow grounds and instead chose to 
make it turn on the acquisition of property. 
We knew from Livingston’s dissent that Pierson’s lawyer, Na-
than Sanborn, listed six errors in the proceedings before the JP and 
that he ultimately abandoned all except the third. The judgment roll 
preserves Sanborn’s original list. As Sanborn had it, the JP court 
committed “manifest error” in the following ways: 
1. Fordham’s order to the constable to summon Pierson was 
directed to either of the two constables of the town of 
Southampton when it should have named a single person; 
                                                                                                
17 John H. Langbein, “Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal Literature,” Colum-
bia Law Review 93 (1993): 594. See also Daniel J. Hulsebosch, “An Empire of 
Law: Chancellor Kent and the Revolution in Books in the Early Republic,” Ala-
bama Law Review 60 (2009): 377-424; Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire: 
New York and the Transformation of Constitutionalism in the Atlantic World, 1664-1830 
(Chapel Hill, N.C. 2003), 277-95; A.W.B. Simpson, “The Rise and Fall of the 
Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of Legal Literature,” University of 
Chicago Law Review 48 (1981): 632-79.  
18 Fernandez, “Great Debate,” 330. 
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2. Pierson was summoned on the same day as the trial, with-
out the minium six days’ notice required under the 
Twenty-Five Dollar Act; 
3. Post’s complaint was “not sufficient in law for the said Lo-
dowick Post to have[,] maintain[,] or support his said ac-
tion”; 
4. The jury summons did not specify the reason for which the 
jurors were to appear; 
5. Fordham “found” the court costs when the jury ought to 
have found them; and 
6. “By the law of the land judgment ought to have been ren-
dered and given” for Pierson, not Post. 
Note two things about this list. First, the first, second, fourth, and 
fifth errors are all procedural. Of these, only the second seems very 
serious, and it is mitigated by Fernandez’s discovery of a partially 
illegible document suggesting that Pierson did in fact have notice of 
the suit, only orally rather than in writing. Fernandez writes of the 
fifth error that Fordham surely itemized and totaled up the court 
costs but that this was not inconsistent with the jury having “found” 
them once he did. 
Even if the Supreme Court judges were not intent on a display 
of learning they might have rejected these arguments. As Donahue 
writes, they are “the kind of picky points that might well be dis-
missed on the ground of harmless error, or, to put it more collo-
quially, ‘we’ve got to cut the JP’s some slack.’” This attitude would 
also have been consistent with the position Samuel Brown took in 
his JP manual: “The sound rule of construction, in respect to the 
courts of justices of the peace, is to be liberal in reviewing their 
proceedings, as far as respects regularity and form.”19 
Second, neither the third error, upon which Sanborn ultimately 
took his stand, nor the sixth (which seemingly duplicates the third) 
identified the particular legal theory Post had advanced. As far as 
they go, they were consistent with either a tort or a property theory 
                                                                                                
19 Donahue, “Papyrology,” 183; Brown, Justices’ Directory, 42, in Fernandez, “Lost 
Record,” 174. 
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of the case. Even so, Fernandez thinks that the tort theory would 
have failed (because of the recreational nature of Post’s hunting). It 
would also have failed to advance the judges’ goal of making a con-
vincing display of their legal learning, because it only required the 
affirmation of a well-recognized principle of the common law. 
If the judges were determined to have a learned discussion of 
“the classic issue of how one establishes possession and ownership of 
wild animals,” the two lawyers in the appeal were quite capable of 
playing their roles, for they were as able as any in the state.20 Na-
than Sanford was appointed a U.S. Commissioner of Bankruptcy in 
1802. The following year he became U.S. Attorney for New York. 
He would hold that post until 1815 and serve in the U.S. Senate 
from 1815 to 1821 and again from 1825 to 1831. He succeeded 
Kent as chancellor, serving between his senatorial terms. Post’s 
lawyer, Cadwallader David Colden, was classically educated in 
New York and London and practiced law in New York City and 
Poughkeepsie. He became U.S. Attorney for New York in 1798 
and mayor of New York City in 1819. He served in the U.S. House 
of Representatives from 1821 to 1823.21 
The authors of the majority and dissenting opinions were also 
well-trained, but their disagreement may well have been a matter of 
“personal politics,” to use Berger’s phrase. Berger notes that Daniel 
Tompkins and Henry Brockholst Livingston were both members of 
New York’s political elite. Tompkins served as governor of New 
York (1807-1817) and Vice President of the United States (1817-
1825). Livingston had been elected to the state assembly in 1786 
and was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1807. Both op-
posed the Federalists and backed Thomas Jefferson in the fierce 
presidential election of 1800. 
Yet the two men had different social origins, which might well 
have influenced how they regarded fox hunting or deference to lo-
cal elites. Livingston was the scion of one of New York’s richest 
                                                                                                
20 Fernandez, “Great Debate,” 302-03. 
21 Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1949 (Washington, D.C., 
1950), 1777, 1000. 
Pierson v. Post 
AUTUMN 2009 41 
families, the owners of 500,000 acres on which lived “thousands of 
tenant farmers in an American version of English manorial society.” 
This quasi-feudal arrangement persisted until the “Anti-Rent Wars” 
of the 1840s.22 Tompkins’s parents, in contrast, lived as tenants on 
a great manorial estate, and although they moved before Tomp-
kins’s birth, his modest social origins were part of his political per-
sona. During his gubernatorial campaign he described himself as “a 
‘humble farm boy,’” who had “‘not a drop of aristocratical or oli-
garchical blood’” in his veins.23 
No one has yet turned up any explanation by Livingston or 
Tompkins of their intentions in writing their opinions. Berger ven-
tures, though, that Livingston might have been speaking for his fel-
low aristocrats when he took up the perspective of the “gentleman” 
in an encounter with “a saucy intruder.” I would add that his “rea-
sonable pursuit” standard would give a great deal of discretion to 
the landowning jurors of the JP courts. Berger also writes that al-
though Tompkins’s opinion was not as revealing of class bias – he 
delivered no tirade against fox hunting as an aristocratic pastime – 
he evidently put vindicating the person who “actually got the job 
done” above defending “the norms of the leisure pursuits of the gen-
tleman.” 
Finally, what about the dog that didn’t bark? If Kent was so in-
vested in the campaign for a learned law, why did he not write an 
opinion? In 1805 he was chief justice, and on many other occasions 
he welcomed the chance to flaunt his erudition. One possibility is 
that Kent had not been present when the decision was argued or 
announced. Fernandez ventures another (without, it must be said, 
much to back her up). As a law student, Tompkins had heard Kent 
deliver a series of law lectures in 1794-1795, but on the bench he 
rarely emulated his master by writing lengthy opinions. In fact, he 
rarely wrote at all. Before Pierson v. Post, Fernandez notes, his opin-
                                                                                                
22 Berger, “It’s Not About the Fox,” 1138. The leading book on the Anti-Rent wars 
is Charles W. McCurdy, The Anti-Rent Era in New York Law and Politics, 1839-1865 
(Chapel Hill, N.C., 2001). 
23 Quoted in Berger, “It’s Not About the Fox,” 1139. 
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ions appeared in reports of only eleven of 258 cases. Three of those 
“opinions” consisted of a single line announcing his agreement with 
his brethren. His opinion in Pierson v. Post was twice as long as any 
he had written before.24  
Fernandez speculates that Kent, in effect, pushed his former stu-
dent Tompkins to the front of the class and made him recite his les-
son. “How else was the process of ‘upgrading’ the legal community 
going to proceed without providing more junior members of the 
bar and bench with such opportunities?” she writes. If this was 
Kent’s aim, Fernandez thinks he must have been disappointed in his 
pupil, for Tompkins “robotically” followed Sanborn’s argument and 
did not produce his own, fresh analysis.25 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
he last word on Pierson v. Post must go to its first historian. 
“Through this case the actors yet live,” wrote Hedges in 1895. 
“They speak, although dead, with a record and a judgment that far 
outlasts all other monument to their memory. Pierson and Post, 




                                                                                                
24 Fernandez, “Great Debate,” 308-09. 
25 Ibid., 328-29, 326. 
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